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Abstract
The setting of the classic prophet inequality is as follows: a gambler is shown the probability dis-
tributions of n independent, non-negative random variables with finite expectations. In their indexed
order, a value is drawn from each distribution, and after every draw the gambler may choose to accept
the value and end the game, or discard the value permanently and continue the game. What is the best
performance that the gambler can achieve in comparison to a prophet who can always choose the highest
value? Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling solved this problem in 1978, showing that there exists a strategy
for which the gambler can achieve half as much reward as the prophet in expectation. Furthermore, this
result is tight.
In this work, we consider a setting in which the gambler is allowed much less information. Suppose
that the gambler can only take one sample from each of the distributions before playing the game, instead
of knowing the full distributions. We provide a simple and intuitive algorithm that recovers the original
approximation of 1
2
. Our algorithm works against even an almighty adversary who always chooses a
worst-case ordering, rather than the standard offline adversary. The result also has implications for
mechanism design – there is much interest in designing competitive auctions with a finite number of
samples from value distributions rather than full distributional knowledge.
∗Harvard University, jackwang@college.harvard.edu
1 Introduction
Consider the following probabilistic game. Let X1, ..., Xn be a sequence of independent random variables
supported on R+ with E[maxiXi] ≤ ∞. A gambler is shown all of the distributions and the game proceeds
by drawing values one at a time from the distributions in the order that they are indexed. At any point the
gambler may choose to either take the value and end the game, or discard the value irrevocably and observe
the next one. Krengel, Sucheston and Garling [14] showed that there exists a stopping rule τ such that
2E[Xτ ] ≥ E
[
max
i
Xi
]
(1)
In other words, there exists a strategy for the gambler to achieve half as much value in expectation as
the prophet who is always able to select the maximum value. Furthermore, this approximation factor is
tight. Consider the following example with two random variables, first demonstrated in [14]. Let X1 be the
random variable which always returns a value of 1, and let X2 be the random variable which has value
1
ǫ
with probability ǫ and value 0 otherwise. The gambler can choose the first and achieve a fixed value of 1,
or she can choose to gamble on the second distribution and achieve an expected value of 1. However, the
prophet’s optimal strategy is to choose the second distribution when it achieves the high value, and choose
the first otherwise. Thus the prophet’s reward is ǫ 1
ǫ
+ (1− ǫ)1 = 2− ǫ.
In this work, we consider a situation in which the gambler has considerably less power. What if instead
of having full knowledge of the distributions, the gambler was only allowed to observe one sample from
each of the distributions before playing the game? Could she even achieve any constant-competitive ratio?
Surprisingly, we show that the gambler can still achieve a 2-approximation with this limited information.
Our algorithm is simple and intuitive – we simply set the highest valued sample as a fixed threshold and
accept the first value which exceeds the threshold. In addition to being an independently interesting result,
this work has practical implications for mechanism design, showing competitive guarantees on welfare and
revenue for a prior-independent order-oblivious posted price mechanism for a single item.
2 Related Work
Since its introduction in [13] and [14], the prophet inequality has spawned a vast line of literature in the
areas of online selection problems and mechanism design. It would be impractical to summarize all of the
literature here, but we will touch on some parts that are relevant and interesting.
The constraint of being able to choose one item has been expanded to many combinatorial domains
including multiple choices [1], matroids [12], and general down-closed set systems [16]. The connection
between prophet inequalities and auction design was first noted by Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg, and Sandholm [11].
Chawla et. al [5] explored this in detail, showing that prophet inequalities could be used to answer questions
about the performance of posted price mechanisms. Recently, Correa et. al explored the reverse direction,
showing that posted price mechanisms and their guarantees could be turned into results about prophet
inequalities [6]. Many threads involving combinatorial prophet inequalities and posted price mechanisms
were united and generalized by Du¨tting et al. [8]. Another recent connection was noted by Lee and Singla
[15] between prophet inequalities and contention resolution schemes, a technique for solving combinatorial
optimization problems.
The closest relation to our work is Azar, Kleinberg, and Weinberg’s exploration of prophet inequalities
with a limited number of samples [2]. In that work, they derive an asymptotically optimal result for single
sample prophet inequalities in the k-choice model, which certainly encompasses a single choice. However,
their result does not include a tight constant factor, and in particular does not characterize a scenario in
which having single samples is just as powerful as having the full distribution.
3 Algorithm
The algorithm proceeds as follows. Let (X1, ..., Xn) be the vector of random variables and (v1, ...., vn) be
the corresponding vector of observed samples. If h is the index of the highest value, we set vh as a threshold
and immediately accept the first value which exceeds the threshold. We assume without loss of generality
1
that there is a strict ordering on all of the values, i.e. no two values are equal to each other. To address the
case in which values can be equal, we use a standard smoothing technique, which is explained in section 3.4.
We now proceed with the analysis.
3.1 A Simplifying Simulation
To analyze the guarantee of this algorithm, we introduce a simulated version of the game. We will argue that
this simulation is equivalent to the original game and show that the algorithm guarantees a 2-approximate
solution under this simulation, which then applies to the original game as well.
Suppose that the person running the game draws two sets of values, (v11 , ...., v
1
n) and (v
2
1 , ..., v
2
n), storing
them before the game begins. Let Cn ∼ Bern(12 )
n be a random vector representing n independent coin flips.
If Cni = 0, then they assign v
1
i to arrive in the sample phase and v
2
i to arrive as a real value, and vice versa
if Cni = 1. Let S denote the vector of values which were assigned as samples, and R the vector of values
assigned as reals. It is easy to see that S and R are distributed exactly as what the gambler would see in
the original game – the distribution of the drawn values is unaffected by conditioning on the coin flip, as all
the values are drawn independently from the original distributions.
We would like to argue that over the randomness of Cn, given fixed (v11 , ...., v
1
n) and (v
2
1 , ..., v
2
n), the
gambler will in expectation receive a 2-approximate value (in comparison to the prophet who can always
pick the maximum value that was sorted into the real values). In other words, we want to show
ECn [ALG|v
1
1 , v
2
1 , ..., v
1
n, v
2
n] ≥
1
2
ECn
[
max
vk
i
∈R
vki |v
1
1 , v
2
1 , ..., v
1
n, v
2
n
]
(2)
If we have shown (2), then we can take the expectation over the draws to obtain
EX1,...,Xn
[
ECn [ALG|v
1
1 , v
2
1 , ..., v
1
n, v
2
n]
]
≥
1
2
EX1,...,Xn
[
ECn
[
max
vk
i
∈R
vki |v
1
1 , v
2
1 , ..., v
1
n, v
2
n
]]
(3)
EX1,...,Xn,Cn [ALG] ≥
1
2
EX1,...,Xn,Cn
[
max
vk
i
∈R
vki
]
(4)
This means that under our simulated game, the algorithm achieves a 2-approximation. Since the random
vector Cn simply decides which of two draws from the same distribution arrive as samples or reals, no matter
if Cn is fixed or random, we still have S and R distributed independently as (X1, ..., Xn). So the above also
implies
EX1,...,Xn [ALG|C
n = (0, ..., 0)] ≥
1
2
EX1,...,Xn
[
max
vk
i
∈R
vki |C
n = (0, ..., 0)
]
(5)
This is precisely the setting of the original game, as values are picked into S and R without any permutation.
Thus, it only remains to prove (2) to show that our algorithm achieves a 2-approximation in the original
game.
3.2 Expected Maximum
Suppose that the person running the game has already drawn (v11 , ...., v
1
n) and (v
2
1 , ..., v
2
n) but has yet to sort
them into S and R. Let Y ki be the probability that given a fixed set of draws, v
k
i becomes the maximum
real value over the randomness of Cn. Then by linearity of expectation the expected maximum conditioned
on these draws can be calculated as ∑
i,k
Y ki v
k
i (6)
Suppose we order all of the draws descending by weight, giving us (vk1i1 , ..., v
k2n
i2n
). Scanning through the
ordering from first to last, at some point we will see some vkmim , v
k
m′
i
m′
such that im = im′ . In other words, we
will encounter two values from the same distribution for the first time. Let this first value which caused us
to record a repeated distribution be vrepeat, and let the other value which came from the same distribution
be vrepeat-pair. To pause for clarity, we should understand that vrepeat-pair > vrepeat, or that vrepeat-pair is the
earlier of the two.
2
Let T be the set of all values greater than vrepeat. Only the values in T and vrepeat have a non-zero
probability of being the maximum value in R. This is because one of vrepeat and vrepeat-pair must become
sorted into R, so any value that is smaller than both vrepeat and vrepeat-pair will always have a larger value
sorted onto the same side as it.
Now we can calculate the value of each Y ki for v
k
i ∈ T . What would need to happen for v
k
i to become
the maximum real value? First, it would obviously need to be sorted into R. Then, every value in T that is
larger than it must be sorted into S. Let T ki denote the set of values in T which are greater than v
k
i . Thus
we conclude that for vki ∈ T ,
Y ki =
(
1
2
)|Tk
i
|+1
(7)
Suppose vki = vrepeat, then it needs to be sorted into R, but this is the same event that vrepeat-pair, an
element in T , is sorted into S. All of the other values in T must be samples as well. Therefore if vki = vrepeat
Y ki =
(
1
2
)|T |
(8)
This gives us a clearer expression of the expected maximum over the randomness of Cn as
( ∑
vk
i
∈T
(
1
2
)|Tk
i
|+1
vki
)
+
(
1
2
)|T |
vrepeat (9)
3.3 Expected Value of Algorithm
Next we want to calculate a lower bound on the expected value of the algorithm. Certainly it would be a
worst case scenario if of all the values in R which exceed the threshold, the algorithm always selects the
smallest one. Let Zki be the probability that v
k
i is selected under this assumption. Only values in the set T
will ever be selected by the algorithm. This is because one of vrepeat or vrepeat-pair must be sorted into S, so
the threshold is no lower than vrepeat.
For a certain value vki ∈ T , what needs to happen for it to be selected under our assumption?
Lemma 1. If the lowest threshold-exceeding value is always selected by the algorithm, a value vki is selected
if and only if the highest value in S ∪R which is lower than vki is the maximum in S.
Proof. Suppose that the highest value lower than vki , which we denote by vthreshold(i,k), is the maximum
value in S. Then vki must be in R, as otherwise it would have been the maximum in S. v
k
i will be selected
as the smallest threshold-exceeding value in R is selected, and there are no values in between vthreshold and
vki . Suppose that vthreshold(i,k) is not the maximum in S. If the maximum in S is smaller, that means that
vthreshold(i,k) is not in S and therefore in R, and it exceeds the threshold, so it or some even smaller value
will be selected over vki . If the threshold is larger, then the threshold is greater than or equal to v
k
i , so v
k
i
will not be selected.
Now for all values, is clear due to symmetry that the probability that a value is the maximum in R is the
same probability that it is the maximum in S. Now we can re-use our insight from 3.2 combined with Lemma
1 to clearly calculate the probability that each value is selected by the algorithm over the randomness of Cn.
Let vlast-in-T be the element in T with the lowest weight. Recall that T
k
i denotes the set of elements in T
larger than vki . Then for all v
k
i ∈ T − {vlast-in-T},
Zki =
(
1
2
)|Tk
i
|+2
(10)
For vki = vlast-in-T,
Zki =
(
1
2
)|T |
(11)
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This lets us conclude that the expected value of the selected element is at least( ∑
vk
i
∈T−{vlast-in-T}
(
1
2
)|Tk
i
|+2
vki
)
+
(
1
2
)|T |
vlast-in-T (12)
=
1
2
[( ∑
vk
i
∈T−{vlast-in-T}
(
1
2
)|Tk
i
|+1
vki
)
+
(
1
2
)|T |−1
vlast-in-T
]
(13)
=
1
2
[( ∑
vk
i
∈T−{vlast-in-T}
(
1
2
)|Tk
i
|+1
vki
)
+
(
1
2
)|T |
vlast-in-T +
(
1
2
)|T |
vlast-in-T
]
(14)
=
1
2
[( ∑
vk
i
∈T
(
1
2
)|Tk
i
|+1
vki
)
+
(
1
2
)|T |
vlast-in-T
]
(15)
≥
1
2
[( ∑
vk
i
∈T
(
1
2
)|Tk
i
|+1
vki
)
+
(
1
2
)|T |
vrepeat
]
(16)
=
1
2
ECn
[
max
vk
i
∈R
vki |v
1
1 , v
2
1 , ..., v
1
n, v
2
n
]
(17)
In the last step, we have substituted the expression for expected maximum that we derived in (9). Thus we
have the desired 2-approximation.
3.4 Smoothing
We mentioned that it is safe to assume that there is a strict ordering over the values. Otherwise, the gambler
performs the following procedure. For all sample or real values vi that she sees, she privately samples
ui ∼ Unif(0, 1) and represents the value as a a pair (vi, ui). Whenever she encounters vi = vj , she compares
ui to uj to determine which one is ”larger”. This is a standard smoothing argument which allows us to
produce a strict ordering over the values with no performance loss.
3.5 Adversaries
Note that in our analysis of the algorithm, we assumed pessimistically that the algorithm accepts the smallest
value which exceeds the threshold and proved the approximation guarantee under this assumption. This
implies that the algorithm holds for a stronger adversary than usual. Using adversary types as defined in
[10], the standard prophet inequality has an offline adversary who is only able to order the random variables
before the game begins. In comparison, the almighty adversary knows all of the random realizations before
the game begins and can choose a different adversarial order for each set of realized values, and the worst-
case ordering for our problem is smallest to largest. Thus we see that our algorithm maintains its guarantee
against the almighty adversary as well.
3.6 Alternative Algorithms
We would like to note that the standard algorithm for the case in which we know the full distributions sets
a fixed threshold of 12E[maxiXi], rather than E[maxiXi], which would be the natural analogue of this single
sample algorithm. For our single sample problem, it is interesting to note that for any c 6= 1, setting cmaxi vi
as a fixed threshold does not guarantee any constant approximation.
For c > 1, this statement is clear, as we can simply consider the case when a single distribution X1 always
has value 1 – the algorithm will never select anything. For c < 1, consider X1 which always has the value 1,
and X2 which has value 2
n with probability 1
n
and 0 otherwise. The expected maximum is 2
n
n
+O(1), but
the algorithm will only receive the large reward when the large reward comes in the sample, setting a high
threshold, and it also comes in the real run. Therefore the expectation of the algorithm is 2
n
n2
+ O(1), and
we lose a factor of n.
4
4 Mechanism Design
This algorithm leads to a prior-independent order-oblivious posted price mechanism (OPM) for selling a
single item to n bidders with welfare guarantee of 12 times the optimum. The reduction is straightforward
and described in Azar et al. [3], while OPMs were first introduced by Chawla et al. [5]. Although it
is interesting that we can guarantee a 2-approximation to optimal welfare with a posted price, the VCG
mechanism reduces to a second price auction for a single item and guarantees full welfare. Therefore we
might like to study whether this leads to any revenue guarantees.
Borrowing Corollary 1 from [3], we may derive a revenue bound for the case when the distributions are
i.i.d. and regular.
Corollary 1. Let M be a comparison-based single-dimensional mechanism that guarantees an α approxi-
mation to welfare for all product distributions. Then when Xi are i.i.d. and regular, M combined with lazy
sample reserves guarantees an α2 approximation to revenue and welfare.
The condition comparison-based requires that our algorithm only be based on the relative ordering of all
of the values, rather than their magnitudes. We can see from our analysis that this condition does indeed
hold. As described in Dhangwatnotai et al. [7], the technique of sample reserves simply refers to setting a
reserve price for each bidder that was equal to the random sample from their distribution. Setting reserves
lazily refers to first running the mechanism and then removing bidders that failed to meet their reserve,
and charging winners the maximum of the mechanism’s price and the reserve price. However, note that any
bidder whose value exceeds the maximum sample certainly exceeds their own sample, and the mechanism’s
price is equal to the maximum reserve price over all bidders, so reserves change nothing about our mechanism.
Thus, our algorithm can lead to a prior-independent single item mechanism which obtains 14 of optimal
revenue in the i.i.d. regular setting. Although [7] already showed a 2-approximation in this setting, our
mechanism is simpler, using only a posted price.
In addition, we may also borrow Corollary 2 from [3] to prove a bound for MHR distributions.
Corollary 2. If M guarantees an α approximation to welfare and distributions are MHR, then M combined
with lazy sample reserves guarantees an α2e approximation to revenue and an
α
2 approximation to welfare.
Again, sample reserves do not change our mechanism, so our posted price guarantees a 14e approximation
to optimal revenue for MHR distributions.
5 Future Directions
The most natural extension of our work would be to build on Azar, Kleinberg, and Weinberg’s work [2] to
achieve a tighter competitive ratio in the k-choice prophet inequality with a single set of samples. We also have
special interest in solving the single sample matroid prophet inequality, for which there is currently no known
constant-competitive algorithm. The current best algorithm has a competitive ratio of O(log log(rank)),
which combines the matroid secretary algorithm of Chakraborty and Lachish [4] or Feldman, Svensson and
Zenklusen [9] with the reduction in [2]. It is curious to note that the natural fusion of the idea from this
paper and the technique from Kleinberg and Weinberg’s paper [12] does not lead to a constant-competitive
algorithm. Thus, we are interested to see what innovations might be required to solve this problem.
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